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A RESPONSE TO HOGAN 
AND SIMPSON 
JOHN P. PELISSERO 
Loyola University Chicago 
TIMOTHY B. KREBS 
University of North Carolina, Greensboro 
The article by Hogan and Simpson provides another piece of the puzzle to 
explain campaign fund-raising coalitions in Chicago elections. We are 
pleased to see that their findings are consistent with our study. Although there 
are some differences in methodology between the two studies, our conclu-
sions are similar: Richard M. Daley and Harold Washington had different 
bases to their campaign fund-raising coalitions, and this helped to produce 
different governing regimes. 
How are the studies similar or different? The Hogan and Simpson article 
has two components-an examination of campaign fund-raising and a 
review of aldermanic support for mayors. Only the first aspect is relevant to 
the research that we have published here. In the second section, Hogan and 
Simpson attempt to link mayoral campaigns to what happens in the Chicago 
city council. Their article attempts also to link mayoral fund-raising to fund-
raising in aldermanic elections (Gierzynski, Kleppner, and Lewis 1996) and 
to support for mayors in city council roll call votes (Simpson 2001). 
Although we did not attempt to establish such a linkage in our research, the 
topic of aldermanic elections has been the subject of significant research by 
Krebs (e.g., 1998, 1999). 
The clear difference in our studies is that whereas we examined campaign 
fund-raising from businesses, unions, political committees, and nonprofit 
organizations, they included individual contributors in their analysis. We had 
both practical and validity concerns that led us to limit the analysis to 
nonindividual contributors. Although both studies worked with campaign 
disclosure reports to classify the fund-raising into sectors, we found it impos-
sible to consistently classify individuals correctly. For each of the five elec-
tion cycles that was included in our study (1983,1987,1989,1991,1995), 
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2. Some further definitions are needed. The "construction" category includes both construc-
tion firms as well as the construction trade unions. The "political" category includes ward orga-
nizations, known party activists givingto individually elected officers, civil servants, and admin-
istrative appointees. The "financial" category includes' investment services such as banking, 
stock brokerage firms, the Chicago futures trading associations, real-estate brokers, and insur-
ance companies. The "personnel" category includes temporary staff services, janitorial services, 
private security agencies, and rubbish removal businesses. The "tourism" category includes res-
taurants, taverns, airlines, taxi associations, casinos, and gifts from persons associated with such 
businesses. 
The "civic" category includes gifts from churches and their preachers who contributed per-
sonally. This grouping also includes chambers of commerce, community organizations, and per-
sons associated with activist groups such as Operation Push and the Urban League. Finally, the 
miscellaneous category included gifts from organizations, businesses, and groups that could not 
fit into the other categories. This would include individuals who identified themselves with a 
group that did not fit into a category . 
. 
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more than 5,000 entries--contributors-were listed for each candidate. Such 
entries include only names and addresses. Thus, for individuals, one would 
need to know each person and whether he or she represented a personal, busi-
ness, or group interest when making a donation. A contribution from John 
Stroger of Chicago would be easily classified as a donation from a politician 
because it is widely known that Mr. Stroger is the president of the Cook 
County Board of Commissioners and the longtime Democratic leader of Chi-
cago's 8th Ward organization. But another entry from John Smith of Chicago 
would not be so easily classified. Therefore, we focused on the nonindividual 
contributions that were more easily classified and more accurately placed in 
the right donor sector. We believe that this produced a set of categories that is 
more finely tuned to reflect the interests of campaign donors. 
The results Qf including and classifying different contributors in our stud-
ies are not inconsequential. Hogan and Simpson report in Figures I and 4 the 
results of two elections, but with substantial "unidentified" contributors. It is 
difficult to make a reasonable comparison between Washington's contribu-
tors in 1987 (Figure I) and Daley's 1999 contributors (Figure 4) because of 
the large component of unidentified contributors-67% in 1987 and 25% in 
1999. It appears from the figures that Washington received only 5.3% of 
funding from "building" interests, whereas Daley received three times that 
amount from the same interests in 1999. But the problem is that too much of 
the data in both figures are not identifiable because of the difficulty of classi-
fying individuals when only name and address are available. 
Another difference in the two studies is the time period examined. Hogan 
and Simpson use fewer elections and a shorter fund-raising period for each. 
Both studies looked at the 1983 election (Washington and Daley as primary 
competitors) and Washington's reelection in 1987. The subsequent elec-
tions are not similar. Whereas we examined the Daley election of 1989 and 
his reelections in 1991 and 1995, Hogan and Simpson look only at the most 
recent Daley reelection of 1999. This produced some different results in the 
two studies. Comparing our Table 3 with their Figure 1 provides an example 
of the differences. Looking at a full year of fund-raising (July 1986 
through June 1987), we show that 23% of contributions came from political 
organizations-the largest share in Washington's 1987 campaign. In the 
Hogan and Simpson study of a six-month period of fund-raising (January 
through June 1987), political interests represented only 2% and ranked sev-
enth among the coalition's partners. We argue that politicians and their orga-
nizations (e.g., political action committees, ward organizations) would give 
money to campaigns early-before the filing deadline in December-to have 
greater influence on who runs for office. The Hogan and Simpson study may 
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have missed some "early" funding by limiting the analysis to the January to 
June period that follows the filing deadline for candidates. Thus, our larger 
sample of contributors produced different findings. 
Finally, we found significant geographic differences in the sources of con-
tributors to the Daley and Washington campaigns. Washington's support was 
more strongly from Chicago neighborhoods and non-Illinois contributors. 
Daley benefited most from Chicago's downtown interests and other Illinois 
donors. Our findings in this area have a similarity to other research on sources 
of support and funding for white versus minority candidates for mayor. 
White, conservative candidates tend to draw more support from downtown 
interests, whereas minority candidates who seek to overturn the governing 
regime in the city must often turn to neighborhood interests and out-of-state 
and national minority interests to establish their campaign's support base 
(see, e.g., Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1997; Holli and Green 1989,81; 
Kleppner 1985, 147, 155; Pinderhughes 1997). This is another area not 
examined in the Hogan and Simpson work. 
Although both studies employed somewhat different approaches and 
methods to studying campaign fund-raising coalitions, the overall conclu-
sions are the same. Washington and Daley had distinctive fund-raising coali-
tions in their mayoral campaigns. We believe that our focus on nonindividual 
contributors, which were easily classified into interests and groups, permit-
ted us to provide more specificity to the identification of the coalition part-
ners. At the same time, we believe that Hogan and Simpson have made a use-
ful addition to the research by attempting to categorize the individual 
contributors to these campaigns. In each case, the studies have made a contri-
bution to better understanding of fund-raising coalitions in mayoral cam-
paigns and to the character of the governing regimes that developed from the 
electoral coalitions of mayors Harold Washington and Richard M. Daley. 
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PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 
Lessons from the 
Miami Abolition Vote 
ANNETTE STEINACKER 
Claremont Graduate University 
Circumstances sUrrounding the 1997 city dissolution vote in Miami were ideal for establishing a 
metropolitan government, based on arguments from the traditional urban politics literature. Yet 
it did not happen. How did the issue make it onto the public agenda but fail to be adopted? The 
author argues that changes in metropolitan governance need to be understood as the outcomes of 
an agenda-setting process and not solely based on the distribution of winners and losers, as sug-
gested by the public-choice/metropolitan reform literature. The Miami case clearly illustrates 
the importance of focusing events, a skilled policy entrepreneur, and timing of events as interest 
fades and the window of opportunity closes. It also illustrates the power of a policy image to trig-
ger emotional attachments that can mobilize inattentive publics. 
On September 4, 1997, a referendum to disincorporate the city of Miami 
was held. Dissolution would have had the immediate effect of consolidating 
the city with the unincorporated territory governed by Metro-Dade County. 
The county government already had primary service delivery responsibilities 
for more than half a million people. Consolidation with the city would have 
added another 350,000 and created a very extensive regional government, 
similar to that advocated in several contemporary works in urban politics 
(Orfield 1997; Pierce 1993; Rusk 1993). Based on the traditional urban poli-
tics literature, conditions were very favorable for this version of a city-county 
consolidation to occur, yet it failed. In the past, consolidation efforts were 
successful in cities where a public service or corruption scandal had 
occurred, suburban residents could not block the vote, minority political 
power would not suffer, and local elite groups such as business, union, or 
media leaders did not oppose the plan (Harrigan 1993). All of these factors 
held in Miami, making it the most likely case for creation of a new metropoli-
tan government in recent time. Examining reasons for its failure illustrates 
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